Thursday, 5 May 2011
No... but a new start please
Monday, 2 May 2011
Game changer: for Pakistan and Osama Bin Laden
Bin Laden's death is an important step in weakening the loose, vague network that we like to put in a box called "Al-Qaeda", but in truth was moulded by Osama Bin Laden's propaganda and charisma into a complex global Islamist extremist network, active from Luton to Lahore and far beyond. His death is a significant but not decisive blow to a network that only exists as a convenient shorthand to help us understand some of the threats that the West faces from global Islamist extremism.
In many ways, the real story and the real history being made today is for Pakistan's relationship with the West. For decades, Pakistan has played a double game. Conniving with the CIA in secretly funding the mujahideen's anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and continuing to fund Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan and Pakistan long after the Soviets had been overthrown and the CIA had withdrawn its own support, it's never quite been clear where Pakistan's loyalities and commitment to rooting out terror have lain.
In 2001, President Musharraf responded to George Bush's "with us or against us" call, and decided to side with the US. In reality, even then, elements in the Pakistani intelligence agencies continued to support attacks on NATO forces inside Afghanistan. This alongside nurturing the Kashmiri terrorists, Lashkar-e-Taiba who went on to murder hundreds in Mumbai as late as 2008.
And now, nearly ten years after 9/11, President Obama has the election winning gift of announcing that US forces have finally killed Osama Bin Laden. In Pakistan. Not in a freezing cold cave in the tribal regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. But in a walled, luxury compound just 40 miles from the capital Islamabad. A compound eight times larger than any other in the city, with two high perimeter walls and within that walls up to four metres thick. A compound less than a kilometre from Pakistan's equivalent of Sandhurst. A garrison town, a hillside resort - a far cry from the desolate caves of Tora Bora where Bin Laden first fled in 2001.
This is a desperate embarrassment for Pakistan. The CIA's relations with Pakistan's intelligence agencies are at an all time low, following the major diplomatic row caused by CIA contractor Raymond Davis and his subsequent release after shooting dead two Pakistani's in Lahore.
That Bin Laden should be found in apparent luxury, close to the Pakistani capital - and for the operation to be carried out by the United States unilaterally without informing Pakistani intelligence, raises serious questions about exactly what Pakistan has been doing with Osama bin Laden these last few years. It seems beyond comprehension that an intelligence outfit as sophisticated as Pakistan's ISI would not have been able to wise up to the fact that Bin Laden was so close, so comfortable, so safe.
Today's real history lies in the fact that Pakistan's bluff has been called. That the CIA's most significant triumph in the war on terror has come when its relations with Pakistan's intelligence agencies are at such a low confirms that the US is more effective when it operates without Pakistani co-operation that it does with it. It confirms that the Pakistanis have been a hindrance rather than a help in the hunt for Bin Laden. It does not yet confirm that the Pakistanis have actively sheltered Bin Laden. But the cirumstances of his death hardly suggest a wholehearted effort on behalf of Pakistan in finding him.
David Cameron got into real trouble last summer, when he suggested that Pakistan "looks both ways on terrorism". But today's events, as both Afghanistan and India have been quick to claim vindication of their scepticism, suggest this might be true.
Cameron's remarks prompted outrage in Pakistan from both government and its people. The outrage was worse for appearing as though the UK was now parroting Indian and American suspicion of Pakistan. But - in the end - Cameron's comments (echoed by many US diplomats) were always as shadowy as the rogue elements in Pakistan's intelligence agencies that they denounced.
No longer. The United States has pulled off a significant coup in its relations with the intelligence agency - in reality a state within a state - it worked with to create today's problems in Afghanistan and that it needs to be reformed to solve Afghanistan. Elements within Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency have never quite given up their sponsorship for terrorism - whether it's insurgents in Afghanistan, Kashmiri terrorists or sheltering Osama Bin Laden.
But today, they have been caught red-handed - in the most blatant way possible - of at best inefficiency and at worst outright connivance with the world's most wanted terrorist.
Al Qaeda may be weakened following Osama Bin Laden's death. But the real game changer may well be in shocking Pakistan's intelligence agencies to stop their double dealing for good. And that may have as much impact on the so-called "war on terror" as any weakening of Al-Qaeda.
Monday, 11 April 2011
Worth a street party
Saturday, 9 April 2011
New Europe, old debates
This week, Portugal finally gave in. After nearly a year of speculation, Prime Minister José Socrates followed Greece and Ireland and requested a whopping EU bailout of £60bn.
Nick Clegg’s election campaign warned of “Greek style unrest” if the UK cut public services too hard. George Osborne this week turned that argument around. Britain will avoid the fate of Greece, Ireland and Portugal because “difficult decisions” have been taken to build “credibility and stability” in the UK economy.
But Portugal’s plight sparks more worry about the coalition’s European policy than it does its economic policy. The Treasury confirmed that Britain may have to contribute £4bn – of, incidentally, borrowed money – to bail out Portugal.
Conservatives are up in arms, claiming that Alistair Darling made Britain liable for eurozone debt at a summit held in the post-election stalemate, as Cameron and Clegg were thrashing out their coalition deal.
That Darling was to blame is, however, in dispute. Darling claims that he consulted Osborne who supported the decision to make Britain liable. Tory Freedom of Information requests for accounts of the discussions between the Chancellors have been stalled.
The information need to be released. This Tory-led government is holier than thou on transparency when it suits them, the former FOI bashers claiming this to be one of the most open administrations ever. Well, trasparency can't be selective: release the information when it's uncomfortable too.
At talks with Angela Merkel in May, the new Prime Minister decided to withdraw the UK from eurozone discussions on crucial issues like bailouts. The result? The UK remains liable to stump up cash for a bail out, but is shut out from the talks that decide the conditions and shape of any bail out.
Sounds familiar? The story of the UK’s involvement in Europe has always been one of sticking our head in the sand and muddling “influence” and “sovereignty”. Once again, a Conservative led government has squandered our influence in order to protect the more illusory goal of “sovereignty” – imagining sovereignty simply something to be “won” or “lost”, not something that can be more effective or less effective depending on how you use it.
Tory MPs cheered David Cameron on his return from the European Council last week, as he repeated the mantra that the UK “is not in the euro, and never will join the euro”.
When will we learn that safeguarding our sovereignty with Europe is not just about saying “no” or shutting ourselves out of debates, as we have done on countless occasions? On the eurozone bailout, we once again find ourselves picking up the bill but not sitting at the same table as the other diners.
George Osborne made it to the EU bailout summit in the end, and returned claiming that the UK will not bail out Portugal.
All rather disingenuous. Of course we won't bailout Portugal bilaterally as we did with Ireland, our nearest neighbour and key trading partner. Osborne knows that the UK most certainly will contribute money to the bail out multilaterally through the European Union.
Of course we need to be careful about liability. The UK did not join the euro and it is right that eurozone countries should shoulder a heavier responsibility in coming to Portugal's rescue. But let's not pretend that we can also let Portugal, and the eurozone, to its fate - almost as some kind of "we told you so" badge of honour to vindicate a policy of non-entry to the euro.
It is entirely right that we help out countries who matter to us economically. And it is in the UK's national interest to see the eurozone succeed. 70% of our trade is with the eurozone. Just as we bailed out Ireland because we were inextricably linked with Ireland through trade, so it is in our interests to make a contribution to seeing the eurozone stabilise.
So let's not let our European policy get stuck in the dogma of the past. Too often, debate on Europe drifts into being "for" or "against". It's not that simple. On matters like the eurozone bailout, let's talk more about our shared interests than about our bottom lines.
With the eurozone, in the Prime Minister's words, we're all in this together. Like it or not.
Monday, 21 March 2011
In it together
It's clear that Gaddafi was brutalising his people. The rebel held city of Benghazi in eastern Libya was under severe threat of a house to house operation by Gaddafi's forces. After the wave of popular revolution swept - mostly peacefully - through Tunisia and Egypt, such a wave of revolution in Libya was always likely to meet an iron Gaddafi fist.
And so, after some weeks of delay whilst the US stood back and let the UK and those former cheese-eating French surrender monkeys lead the way, we have a UN resolution that authorises "all necessary steps" to deal with Gaddafi. Or, specifically, "all necessary steps" to protect civilians, freeze Gaddafi's assets and establish a no-fly zone over Libya. So far, so good, for the Arab League and for the Russians and Chinese who felt no need to wield their vetoes.
Resolution secured, David Cameron secured some deserved plaudits. He held firm, and dashed the doubters who scorned his flirtation with a no-fly zone in the face of American indifference. In truth, the United States have played a clever game. They've stood back, let other countries do the running, keen to avoid the perception of the United States once again deciding to meddle in an Arab nation's affairs.
But now the tough part starts. They may have held back diplomatically, but the bombs and missiles that began hitting Gaddafi targets over the weekend have, of course, been overwhelmingly from the United States. A spatter of European nations have joined in, including Britain, with a Tornado here and a Tomahawk missile there from Mediterranean submarines.
And where is it all going to lead? As a student, I remember defending Tony Blair's invasion of Iraq whilst the vast majority of my peers were marching in the streets of London. In favour of intervention then, perhaps I've learned a new scepticism on military action.
Libya in 2011 is not Iraq in 2003. But we still need to be sure we are getting this right. Dealing with maniac dictators isn't easy, and Gaddafi is right up there with the looniest. Once again, we've gone in without a clear idea of how we get out. Without a clear idea of whether we're up for regime change or whether we just want to keep the peace and get Gaddafi to back off for a bit. We've set off again without a clear sense of our objective.
Ministers are making confusing noises. Over the weekend, Liam Fox appeared to talk up the possibility that Gaddafi himself is a target, saying it would "potentially be a possibility" in very halting tones. Fox then clarified that "avoiding civilian casualties" would be the main consideration in that "possibility", not a view reflected by his Chief of Defence staff today who said clearly that it was "not allowed" under UN Resolution 1973.
This all reflections a confusion, once again, at the heart of another coalition set up to intervene in another Arab state as to what our goals are. We're only just getting them right in Afghanistan after ten years fighting. And once again, with Libya, we are clearer about the moral case for action that developing the action plan that will best deliver that moral cause. Getting the ethics right is a decision based on emotion, our hard planning for all outcomes is once again lacking. Protecting civilians is a short-term objective, we still need a long-term objective to deal with the effect of delivering that short-term objective. If we do bring security to civilians, what consequences - happy as they may be - does that security bring?
What do we do if there's a stalemate? If Gaddafi, after a week or so of uncomfortable bombing, backs off Benghazi and retreats. What do we do if Gaddafi concedes eastern Libya but hangs on in the west, effectively partitioning Libya? What do we do when (I say pessimistically) the civilian casualties reach a level that causes Arab countries to withdraw their support (the Arab League has already made sceptical noises about the military action being "different" to a no-fly zone), and perhaps even openly question our intervention... creating another running sore of Western military overstretch in another Arab nation?
The moral cause may be right, the UN Resolution may have been cleverly won - but noone really knows where we go from here. Minister don't even need to rule out the use of ground troops, because Gaddafi will know that no Western government will be up for that. The most likely outcome seems to be a rough equivalent to the air strikes against Saddam Hussein in the mid 1990s - Operation Desert Fox - an air campaign, the madman retreats, the West imposes sanctions, but the madman basically hangs on pretty effectively.
That is probably the best outcome we can hope for. But whatever happens, we've thrown our lot in decisively with the Libyan people. We'd better get it right, and learn the lessons of the past. And we'd better not create another recruitment video for Al-Qaeda.
Thursday, 3 March 2011
A bit simple
The Libya crisis has tested the Government the most. The Foreign Office failed to see it coming, with diplomats reportedly saying - as President Mubarak of Egypt fell - that Gaddaffi would be safe. And the crisis coincided horribly with David Cameron popping up on a tour of the Middle East to sell arms (part of Britain's mercantilist foreign policy - trade missions to woo India here, selling arms to the Middle East there), when Colonel Gaddaffi began to point British-sold arms at his own people as they rallied against him and for their democratic rights.
Since then, Cameron and Hague have been floundering. Cameron was this week cut loose by the United States on the idea of a no-fly zone over Libya. Hawkish in a statement to Parliament on Monday, he was toning down any military rhetoric at PMQs on Wednesday. There are reportedly splits in the Cabinet, with Hague and Clegg having to fend off interventionist aspirations from Fox, Gove and Osborne. Cameron, meanwhile, is stuck in the middle.
All of this smacks of the Government having not quite become used to being a Government. Its handling of the crisis has consisted of statements one might expect of an Opposition, where it doesn't in the end bear responsibility. Talking up a no-fly zone without checking whether the United States was up for it was inept and damaging for British foreign policy. And the Government has seemed flat-footed on its recently completed strategic defence review - flirting with the idea of a no-fly zone in the same few weeks as decommissioning one of Britain's few aircraft carriers and laying off a hundred or so pilots in the middle of their training. They say that the UK's defence review doesn't need a rethink, that we're not cutting our Armed Forces too far and too fast.
I'm not sure I belive them. And here's why. The Libya handling reflects one of the most troubling aspects about the Government that Nick Clegg's Lib Dems have allied themselves too. It's all a bit simplistic. Economic policy is about cuts. Foreign policy is about trade and national security. Domestic policy is about... cuts and the Big Society, a good idea in dire need of some detail and leadership. The Government needs a deeper sense of what it is trying to do for Britain and where it is taking us. Simple messages are good, but not if the policies behind them are simplistic.
That, I believe, is the real issue that should worry Liberal Democrats worried about the Coalition Government that we have joined.
Sunday, 6 February 2011
Cameron's "muscular liberalism"
David Cameron’s speech in Munich yesterday has grabbed headlines. The Prime Minister stating that the “state doctrine of multiculturalism” has “failed” provides a memorable and thought-provoking strap-line for his speech. It should provoke a lot of soul-searching.
Declaring multiculturalism as having failed would not always have been this easy. Tolerant Brits – and there are many of us – would have seen criticising multiculturalism as in itself some kind of attack on Britain, akin to bashing the NHS or the BBC. The multiculturalism that Cameron claims is now harming Britain, was once seen as a very British trait – of treading a careful and tolerant middle ground, not wishing to offend or be extreme.
Now, Cameron says this British trait is a threat to Britain. His remarks prioritised combating Islamist violent extremism as the driver for a re-think. But, in what was a short speech, the link between different cultures leading separate lives and extremists who threaten our national security was not sufficiently clear. Cameron said we should do more to tackle hate preachers. He said we should do more to tackle forced marriages, where the weakness of our challenge “reinforces a feeling that not enough is shared”.
It was a short speech in which Cameron dashed quickly across a political minefield. The basic summary of the speech – that we need to find a more cohesive approach to glue our society together – is right. And we probably do the “muscular liberalism” that he spoke of – arguing strongly for the liberal values that are part of British society.
This is still a problem in search of a solution. The most pressing need is for there to be a higher quality debate. Less polarised. Less defensive both within the Muslim community and outside it. But I can’t help feeling that arguing for greater community integration in the context of tackling violent Islamist extremism, will only make that task harder. It is broader than that. It involves isolating extremists on both sides – including the thousands of English Defence League activists who crowded the streets of Luton yesterday.
If “muscular liberalism” is to work, it cannot point the finger at one part of society. To do so risks entrenching separate communities further. They are defensive. They are polarised. We must criticise where criticism is necessary, but as Cameron says “we are all in this together”. So, Cameron’s approach of saying “to belong here is to believe in these things” needs to apply to everyone – including the dinner party Islamophobes identified by Baroness Warsi who polarise the debate further by failing to separate religion from political ideology.
And if we are to flex our liberal muscles more – it needs to be as much about what values we believe in, as the values we put into practice. It is no coincidence that the majority of areas in which there are racial tensions are deprived areas, where the fight for public services and jobs is more acute. We need a wide debate, but actions will be as important as words.